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1 Introduction
A common argument holds that the patent system promotes the diffusion of the
technical information embodied in inventions: “Under our patent system, that which
might forever remain locked up as a trade secret is now open for inspection (Rogan,
2002).” U.S. law requires each patent to disclose sufficient technical information to allow
skilled practitioners of the art to recreate the invention, allowing the invention to diffuse.
This benefit is separate from the argument that patents provide stronger incentives for
innovation.
But survey evidence suggests that firms do not place much value on the disclosed
information (Macdonald, 1998, Tang et al. 2001, Cohen et al. 2002). Moreover, those
firms that do read patents do not use them primarily as a source of information on
technology. Instead, they use them for other purposes, such as keeping track of
competitors or checking for infringement (Oppenheim, 1998).
There are, in fact, sound theoretical reasons why the disclosed information may not
be very valuable. Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose (1950) report that the argument about
diffusion is an old one, popular since the mid-nineteenth century. They also point out
that, at least through the 1950s, economists have been skeptical about this argument.
The problem, also recognized in the mid-nineteenth century, is that “only
unconcealable inventions are patented,” so patents reveal little that could not be
otherwise learned. On the other hand, “concealable inventions remain concealed”
(Machlup and Penrose, 1950, p. 27). The disclosure argument appears to be based on a
false, “apples to oranges” comparison—it assumes that under the patent system, all
patentable inventions are patented.1 Since evidence shows that not all patentable
inventions are patented (Cohen et al. 2000, Moser 2003), a more careful counterfactual
comparison is required.
But this counter-argument does not take licensing into account. Although patentable
inventions might diffuse both with and without a patent system, they might diffuse more
rapidly under a patent system via licensing. Some advocates argue that the patent system
facilitates “markets for technology,” thus accelerating the diffusion of inventions to new
1For a more recent example of this counter-argument, see Friedman, Landes and Posner (1991).
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applications.
This note builds a simple model of disclosure with and without patents, with and
without licensing. I evaluate specifically whether patent disclosure facilitates the
diffusion of inventions within an industry given that diffusion may also occur via
imitation or independent invention. Society benefits from diffusion because competition
reduces deadweight losses. Also, diffusion may improve prospects for subsequent
sequential innovations (Bessen and Maskin 2000, Green and Scotchmer 1990).
Denicolò and Franzoni (2004) have a complementary model with some stronger
results, but they assume a specific demand function and imitation cost function.
The literature identifies other possible social benefits and costs of disclosure not
directly considered here: disclosure may affect rent-seeking behavior (Boldrin and Levine
2004, Landes and Posner 2003); disclosure may communicate other uses for a technology
(Landes and Posner 2003); disclosure may be used to signal costs of production or
imitation (Horstmann et al. 1985, Anton and Yao 2004). Finally, disclosure improves the
efficiency of the patent system by allowing potential innovators to know when they might
infringe.

2 Disclosure Model Without Licensing
Consider a simple game involving two risk-neutral firms, A and B, in the same
industry.2 Initially, assume that neither patents nor trade secrets can be licensed. There
are two regimes: one with patent and trade secrecy law and another with only trade
secrecy. Firm A has an invention that gives it a temporary monopoly. Firm B might like
to share these profits. The interaction occurs in a simple game of sequential decisions
with three stages (see Figure 1):
1) Firm A decides whether or not to patent, if patent protection is available.
Patenting costs k more than trade secrecy alone.3
2) Firm B decides whether to develop a substitute invention independently or not.
Firm B can develop such an invention by “inventing around” A's patents or
2

The model can be extended to allow multiple firms to freely enter; results are similar.

3Landes and Posner (2003) point out that there are socially wasteful costs of maintaining trade secrecy. I assume that

firms still maintain secrecy for non-disclosed knowledge even if they obtain patents. So k is the incremental costs of
patenting and I ignore explicit consideration of trade secrecy costs. Empirical evidence suggests that patenting costs
(including enforcement costs) are substantially greater than the costs of trade secrecy (Lerner 1994).
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imitating4 firm A’s product. To develop, firm B sinks a lump sum investment of
c i > 0, i = S , P where “S” designates that the invention is protected only by
trade secrecy and “P” designates patent protection. Given this investment, firm
i
i
B invents successfully with probability q , i = S , P, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 .

3) The firms produce.
The payoffs are determined as follows. Consider first a regime without patents. If
firm B successfully invents a substitute, both firms earn a stream of duopoly profits. The
present value of this stream is VD . If firm B does not successfully invent, then firm A
earns monopoly profits with present value VM , and firm B earns 0. Let VM ≥ 2VD .5
VM

If patents are available, but firm A chooses only trade secrecy protection, then the
same payoffs will apply. I assume firm B cannot patent and exclude A.6
If firm A patents and firm B invents around the patent, both firms earn duopoly
profits. Finally, if firm A patents and firm B does not invent around that patent, firm B
nevertheless imitates costlessly once the patent expires. In a more elaborate model in
continuous time, with discount rate r and patent term T, firm A would earn
(1 − e − rT ) VM + e − rT V D and firm B would earn e − rT V D . For simplicity, the model
developed here considers diffusion only at a single point in time— q i are probabilities
rather than hazard rates. To capture the effect of diffusion at patent term, I define a
− rT
probability of diffusion with unimitated patents of q ≡ e . This clearly generates the

same expected profits as in a more elaborate model in continuous time. For consistency,

q P > q where q P implicitly includes the diffusion at patent term.
The payoff matrix for the regime with patents is then

4 This includes reverse engineering, where firm B gains some useful information about A's technology for the product,
and also independent invention.
5The results of this section only require

VD < VM

.

6 Under US patent code 102(b), if the invention was for use or sale for one year prior to B’s invention, B is barred

from obtaining a patent. This applies to cases where the invention is embodied in a commercial product, even though
the invention may be hard to reverse-engineer (such as the inside of a safe, Hall v. MacNeale). Under US Code 102(g),
firm B can obtain a patent on a secret innovation if firm A “abandoned, concealed, or suppressed” the invention (and it
is not a business process). As long as Firm B imitates relatively quickly (e.g. less than four years after A), firm A will
most likely not have “concealed or suppressed” in this model (Paulik v. Rizkalla). Europe has a general prior use
defense for both product and process inventions.
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No Imitation
No Patent

VM , 0

Firm A
Patent

(1 − q ) V M + q V D − k , q V D

Firm B
Imitate / Invent Around

(1 − q S ) VM + q S VD ,
q SVD − c S
(1 − q P ) VM + q PV D − k ,
q PV D − c P

The payoff matrix for the no-patent regime is just the first row of this matrix.
S
To simplify the analysis, I temporarily assume that c > q VD . This is consistent with

empirical evidence of substantial imitation costs (Mansfield et al. 1981).
The solution regions for the patent regime are shown in a phase diagram in Figure 2.
P
S
The horizontal axis shows q , (beginning at q ) and the vertical axis shows q . Firm B

P
P
will choose to invent around a patent when q > q + c VD , corresponding to the right
S
S
side of the figure. Firm B will choose to imitate a trade secret when q > c V D ,

corresponding to the upper half of the figure. Then, considering firm A’s optimal choices,
four distinct solution regions result as shown. Diffusion does not occur in region (D); in
this case, “concealable inventions remain concealed.” In region (A), diffusion only occurs
when the patent expires. In regions (B) and (C), firm B actively attempts to imitate.
The patent regime can be compared to the no-patent regime by examining the
differences in the probability of diffusion in each region of the phase diagram of the
patent regime:
(A) In this case, the diffusion probability will be greater under the no-patent regime.
In the patent regime, diffusion only occurs at patent expiration; without patents, the
invention is actively imitated.
(B) In this region, active imitation occurs in both regimes, however, it is easy to show
S
P
that for this region, q > q , so, again, diffusion is more likely in the no-patent
regime.
(C) In this region, the firms behave the same in both regimes.
(D) In this region, behavior is also the same.
Comparing these results, it follows that Machlup and Penrose are basically correct:
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Proposition 1. For the case without licensing, the probability of diffusion under a
patent system is less than or equal to the probability of diffusion under a regime with
S
only trade secrecy, as long as c > q VD .
The intuition behind this result is simple: firms use patents when they reduce or
eliminate imitation. Therefore, diffusion via imitation is less in these situations than if
there were no patents. This result takes as given that the invention has been made,
regardless of the legal regime. The discussion here concerns only diffusion and not
invention incentives.
Note that faster diffusion does not necessarily imply greater social welfare if that
diffusion is achieved with a greater expenditure of socially unnecessary cost. Imitation
costs will be greater without patents in region A and possibly in region B, but the net
social welfare effect depends on the benefits to diffusion, which could be large. Denicolò
and Franzoni (2004) find that social welfare is greater with patents, but their result
depends on a specific functional relationship between c S and q S and an optimal patent
term, which may be quite short.
S
If the patent term is short, competition is soft and/or c S is small so that c < q VD ,

then a limited region exists where the invention will diffuse at patent term in a regime
with patents, but would be kept concealed in a no-patent regime.

3 Model with Licensing
These results may change when licensing is considered. Indeed, it is often argued
that patents facilitate the licensing of technology and promote “markets for technology.”
On the other hand, the empirical evidence indicates a robust (though perhaps imperfect)
market for technology know-how that does not necessarily involve patents. This section
extends the model above to consider licensing.
First, it is important to distinguish technology transfer agreements, which involve
technical information and may or may not include patent rights, from pure patent
licenses, which provide patent rights but do not provide the licensee any new technical
information or “know-how.” Pure patent licenses merely permit the licensee to operate
without threat of litigation. Diffusion concerns true technology transfer licenses, so these
are the only licenses I consider here.
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The literature identifies two relative virtues of the patent system for licensing: 1) it
may be relatively difficult to contract over trade secrets, and, 2) the incentives to license
patents may be greater. I consider each issue consecutively.

3.1

Contracting over trade secrets and patents
Cheung (1982, p. 44) argues that a defect of trade secrecy is “the obstruction of the

spread of new ideas which could otherwise be put to use through contractual
agreements.” The literature identifies two main differences between patents and trade
secrets that affect technology licensing: verifiability and expropriation. First, consider
whether use of an invention can be verified by a third party. Cheung calls observability
the “key element of patents:” well-defined specification and claims allow courts to make
a determination whether a licensee (or possible infringer) is actually using a patented
invention or not. This is important for contract enforcement against licensees who, once
they have obtained knowledge of the invention, might claim to be using some other
technology.
Clearly, many trade secrets lack such clear definition. However, the problem posed
here specifically concerns patentable inventions, which could be protected either by trade
secrecy or patent. The very same specification and claims contained in a patent could be
written up for a trade secret, allowing a court to determine similarly whether the licensee
is, in fact, using the invention or not. Detailed technical documentation serves this
practical purpose in many technical know-how licenses. The enforcement of the contract
only differs as to whether it is conducted under contract law or patent law. Moreover,
enforcement of a technical know-how contract may have an advantage over a patent
license: a patent license may lose force if the patent is declared invalid (perhaps as the
result of actions by a third party). So, verifiability does not seem to raise a particular
problem for licensing trade secrets in the situation considered here.
However, the second issue, the possibility of expropriation, does raise a particular
concern, especially with trade secrets. The problem arises during the negotiation of a
contract when the quality of the invention is private knowledge of the inventor.7 Suppose
there are “good” inventions that generate profits and “bad” inventions that do not. The
7Alternatively, a problem arises if the licensee is not sure that the licensor is providing the “good” information it may
have. This is equivalent to the case modeled here.
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prospective licensee will want some assurance that the invention to be licensed is of the
good type. One way, but not the only way, the inventor can provide this assurance is to
disclose sufficient information to the prospective licensee. But doing so risks
expropriation—not yet subject to a contract, the prospective licensee may use the
disclosed knowledge without licensing it.
Here patents have an advantage: in the event of expropriation, a licensor with a
patent may sue for infringement, while a licensor with only trade secret protection may
have little legal recourse. But this does not mean that technologies cannot be licensed
without patent protection.
Indeed, the literature shows that private agents are often quite versatile at contracting
around such obstacles.8 For instance, contracts may specify royalties contingent on some

ex post observable performance such as sales and avoid ex ante disclosure altogether.
This may be sufficient to separate “bad” inventors from “good”—bad inventors, facing
zero or negative profits, may not sign such a license. Alternatively, Arora (1995) shows
that tacit knowledge of uncertain quality can be licensed when bundled with
complementary goods or services.
Also, Anton and Yao (1994, 2002) show that a small inventor may safely disclose
part or all of the invention prior to contracting as long as the prospective licensee has a
competitor. The inventor can threaten to license the competitor. As long as duopoly
profits are positive and the licensee makes greater profits with a monopoly on the
invention, this threat is sufficient to deter expropriation.
Thus, except for the situation of a small inventor trying to license a monopolist, it
appears that trade secrets can be licensed wherever patents can be licensed. In practice,
there is a robust market in technology licenses that do not include patents. Indeed,
Contractor (1981) found that only 39.5% of technology transfer agreements with
unaffiliated licensees included the transfer of patent rights. More generally, survey
evidence finds that patent licensing is a relatively unimportant channel for firms to obtain
technical knowledge in comparison to consulting, research collaborations, etc. where
private technical information (presumably trade secrets) is transferred as part of a bundle
of services (Agrawal and Henderson 2002).
8Gallini and Wright 1990, Arora, 1995, Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella, Anton and Yao, 1994,2002.
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3.2

The “market for technology” under full information
But do patents provide stronger incentives for licensing? It is sometimes argued that

patents, especially “strong” patents, promote markets for technology. Patents are held to
improve the inventor’s bargaining position in any licensing negotiation. This generates
larger royalty income, hence providing a stronger incentive to license. With strong patent
rights, the argument goes, inventors will choose to license more often.
A simple extension of the model above demonstrates that this intuition is not correct.
Consider this modified game: in stage 2a, firm A decides whether it wishes to engage in
licensing. If so, then in stage 2b the firms bargain. If not, then B can choose to imitate as
above (it turns out that the firms will always agree on a license if firm B can feasibly
imitate, so this does not occur). Then, in stage 3, if the firms do not license, profits are as
above; if the firms do license, the license determines their profits.
The firms will find it profitable to license when joint profits under a license exceed
the joint profits achieved without cooperation, that is, when there is a net bargaining
surplus. Suppose that firm A can craft an optimal license with firm B such that the joint
profits are VM with trade secrets and VM − k with patents.
The joint profits without cooperation depend on whether firm B chooses to imitate or
not. If B does imitate, non-cooperative joint profits are

(1 − q S ) VM + 2 q S VD − c S and

(1 − q P ) VM + 2 q P VD − k − c P

(1)

for trade secrets and for patents respectively. The net bargaining surpluses (the
cooperative joint profits less the non-cooperative joint profits) are then

c i + q i (VM − 2 VD ) > 0,

i = S, P .

(2)

In words, a cooperative agreement saves imitation costs and dissipation of rents to
consumers. This means that licensing will occur in regions B and C in a patent regime
and will occur in the entire upper portion of the phase diagram (A, B and C) in a regime
with no patents.9
On the other hand, in region D (no patents, no imitation), the net bargaining surplus
is zero and licensing does not occur. Further, I assume that antitrust considerations
prevent a license that permits monopoly profits after a patent expires in region A. So
9Note that because the net bargaining surplus may be greater without patents, firm A’s profits from licensing are not

necessarily greater with patent protection.
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here, too, net bargaining surplus is zero and licensing does not occur in a patent regime.
S
Proposition 2. Assuming complete information, zero transaction costs, c > q VD ,
every technology licensed in a regime with patents will also be licensed in a regime
without patents and some technologies licensed in a no-patent regime will not be
licensed with patents.

In other words, the extent of the market for licenses may actually be greater without
patents. The intuition is simple: licensing occurs where there is a credible threat of
imitation. Because imitation occurs in more restricted circumstances with patents than
without patents, the extent of licensing is less with patents. As above, technologies with
very low imitation costs may have exceptions for certain parameter values.
This proposition assumes symmetric information and no transaction costs. These
may also make results ambiguous. However, here, too, transaction costs for licensing
trade secrets would have to be very large to offset the broader range of circumstances
where firms would want to license without patent protection. The importance of nonpatent technology transfer employed by university professors suggests these costs are not
large (Agrawal and Henderson 2002).

4 Conclusion
When firms can choose whether to protect inventions by patents or by trade secrecy,
this model suggests that diffusion of the technical information embodied in inventions is
not enhanced by the patent system and may well be delayed.
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